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COMMENTS
EL MONTE IS THE PROMISED LAND: WHY Do ASIAN IMMIGRANTS
CONTINUE TO RISK THEIR LIVES TO WORK FOR SUBSTANDARD
WAGES AND CONDITIONS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Illegal immigrants, who are willing to work in less than human
conditions, continue to inundate the United States. The recent
raid in El Monte, California has exposed the typical abuses that
illegal immigrant workers are willing to suffer in order to earn far
less than the federal minimum wage standard.' It is hard to imag-
ine that an immigrant would willingly want to face these condi-
tions. Yet, ironically, the stories of the El Monte workers, which
have traveled back to Thailand, have only encouraged more Thais
to make the journey to the United States. 2
The Thai government's response to the El Monte situation is
dismaying. The "director of the Foreign Ministry's office in charge
of safeguarding the interests of Thais 'overseas seemed unfazed by
what allegedly happened in El Monte. ' ' 3 "The consulate, and the
Thai government, have no interest in helping these people. All
they care about is saving their face. The consulate is telling them
'You're costing the United States government money. It's embar-
rassing. You should go back'."' 4
As harsh as this attitude seems, the El Monte incident is rou-
tine in Thailand where the minimum daily wage is 145 baht, or
$6.07. 5 Moreover, despite Thailand's labor laws, many workers in
Bangkok sweatshops are being paid as little as 80 baht, or $3.35,
1. See Bill Wallace, 70 Immigrants Found in Raid on Sweatshop: Thai Workers Tell
Horror Stories of Captivity, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 4, 1995, at A12.
2. See John-Thor Dahlburg, Sweatshop Case Dismays Few in Thailand Southeast
Asia, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1995, at A4.
3. Id.
4. Karl Schoenberger & Shawn Hubler, Asian Leaders Call for Release of Thai
Workers, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1995, at B1.
5. See id.
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for a working day that can last 16 hours.6 Thai citizens trying to
escape these conditions are easily persuaded by recruiting groups
promising workers higher wages in the United States.7
The recruiting groups themselves pose another problem in
U.S. efforts to crack down on labor law violations in the garment
district. In many cases, the recruiters are Asian-based crime
groups. 8 These groups collaborate to recruit, smuggle, and im-
prison garment workers. 9 The totality of these factors makes it
apparent that the United States faces a constant uphill battle in its
struggle to deter unauthorized immigrant employment.
This Comment compares U.S. and Thai labor in an effort to
determine why the wave of illegal immigrants from Thailand
seems to be unending. Part II discusses U.S. sweatshops and the
conditions facing Thai immigrants once they enter the United
States. Part III examines specific Thai and U.S. labor law provi-
sions to analyze how inhumane conditions can openly exist despite
strong U.S. regulations and labor law provisions in Thailand's
Constitution. Part IV examines current U.S. attempts to halt the
flow of unauthorized immigrant employment. Parts V and VI ex-
amine negligence and strict liability as potential bases for manu-
facturer liability and possible methods of curbing inhumane
working conditions. Part VII argues for imposing a strict liability
standard on the manufacturer as a means to control the continuing
influx of the illegal immigrant workforce. This theory is based on
the idea that, if a sufficient nexus exists between the garment
manufacturer and the contractor, the manufacturer owes an abso-
lute duty of care to garment workers.
II. SWEATSHOPS: THE UNDERGROUND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
A "sweatshop" is a business that regularly violates both wage
or child labor laws and safety or health regulations. 10 Unfortu-
6. See Dahlburg, supra note 2.
7. See James Sterngold, California Raids Link Organized Crime, Sweatshops,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Aug. 25, 1995, at A2, available in 1995 WL 61024486.
8. See id.
9. See John Horn, INS, El Monte Defend Failure to Discover Sweatshop: Senate
Probes Why Surveillance, Tips, Inspections Fell Short, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 26, 1995, at
A7.
10. See Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the
Need for Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179, 2181 (1994)
[Vol. 19:173
1996] Why Asian Immigrants Continue to Risk Their Lives 175
nately, sweatshops are an integral part of the garment industry.
The garment industry in the United States is a very profitable one,
with revenues in California alone reaching billions of dollars an-
nually.1' The largest apparel centers in the United States are lo-
cated in New York City, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.
12
Across the United States, there are over one million garment
workers in an industry dominated by small companies.
13
The basic structure of the garment industry consists of: the re-
tailer, usually a department store or boutique; the garment manu-
facturer, such as Guess? or Esprit; the contractor/shop owner; and
the garment worker.14 The profit margins are the largest at the top
of the chain: the profit per garment to the retailer, which is usually
greater than a 100% markup to the consumer, typically exceeds
twice the profit to the garment manufacturer, which in turn ex-
ceeds twice the profit to the contractor.15
The El Monte incident illustrates the abuses that sweatshops
promulgate. The California Labor Department's investigation
concluded that these workers labored an average of 115 hours a
week and were paid 69¢ an hour.1 6 The El Monte factory was a
seven-unit apartment complex, completely surrounded by razor
wire fences to prevent escape. 17 The building had no air condition-
ing, windows were covered, and as many as sixteen workers shared
(citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/HRD-88-130BR,
"SWEATSHOPS" IN THE U.S.: OPINIONS ON THEIR EXTENT AND POSSIBLE EN-
FORCEMENT OPTIONS 16 (1988)).
11. San Francisco alone has a five-billion-dollar-a-year industry, which employs over
10,000 workers, most of whom are Chinese women. See Susan Sward & Bill Wallace,
Problems at S.F. Garment Shops, S.F. CHRON., July 25, 1991, at Al; see also Bob Baker,
Union Targets Sweatshop Operators, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1990, at B3 (reporting that
there are over 90,000 garment workers in the garment district of downtown Los Angeles);
Harry Bernstein, Labor: Sweatshop a Complex Problem, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1990, at D3
(estimating garment industry revenues at six billion dollars a year in Orange and Los An-
geles Counties).
12. See Sward & Wallace, supra note 11, at Al.
13. See id. at A15.
14. See Leo L. Lam, Comment, Designer Duty: Extending Liability to Manufacturers
for Violations of Labor Standards in Garment Industry Sweatshops, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
623 (1992).
15. See Steven A. Chin, Bay's Ugly Secret, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 13, 1989, at A10
(showing the chain of operation in the garment industry).
16. See Patrick J. McDonnell & Paul Feldman, Top Retailers May Have Sold Sweat-
shop Goods, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1995, at Al.
17. See Wallace, supra note 1, at A12.
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the same bedroom.18
Furthermore, the usual sweatshop situation is unsafe and un-
sanitary. 19 Inside a typical sweatshop, the workers sit in a crowded
space, wear a surgical mask, if they are lucky enough to be pro-
vided with one, and "hunch over a sewing machine . . . pushing
fabric past a speeding needle as quickly as [their] hands [can] man-
age."20
A sophisticated smuggling ring recruited the El Monte work-
ers in Thailand.21 Once the smuggling ring recruited the workers,
it provided them with false documents that enabled them to enter
the United States as tourists.22 The smuggling ring also provided
the workers with "show money" in case U.S. immigration officials
questioned them about their planned tourist activities. 23 The
smuggling ring charged each worker $5,000 for the journey to the
United States, which the workers repaid by working in the fac-
tory.2
4
Generally, once in the United States, the workers keep silent
about the abuses they endure in sweatshops because of employers'
express or implied threats to report them to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service if they complain.25 Another factor confin-
ing garment workers to their occupations is their lack of English
18. See id.
19. See Lam, supra note 14, at 634 (citing Michael Freitag, New York Is Fighting
Spread of Sweatshops, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1987, at Al).
20. Id. at 633 n.60 (citing William Serrin, After Years of Decline, Sweatshops Are
Back, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1983, at Al, which gives the following description:
Often garment industry workers must walk three or four flights to their facto-
ries, up dark, dingy, littered hallways. Elevators, when they exist, are often old
and small and overburdened; it would take too long to wait for them.
Cloth seems to fly through the machines as the seamstresses make blouses,
skirts, dresses, trousers.
The factories hum with the noise of machines-electric cutting knives, sewing ma-
chines, pressing machines. Radios flay loudly, and there is babble in foreign
languages and the steam and smell of the food that workers often eat at their
benches. Floors often are littered with cloth remnants and stacked with cut
goods or rolled goods. The factories are hot or cold, depending on the season).
21. See Karl Schoenberger et al., 21 Thais Found in Sweatshop Are Released, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1995, at Al.
22. See Patrick J. McDonnell & Paul Feldman, 9 Indicted in Alleged Operation of
Thai Sweatshop, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1995, at B1.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See Foo, supra note 10, at 2182.
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skills. 26 Many of the workers are untrained for other types of work
and believe that sewing is their sole means for survival in the
United States.27 Reporting abuses may also result in being black-
listed from other local factories. 28 An additional threat to the El
Monte workers was the fact that the factory contained armed
guards.29 Left with no options, the workers toll away.
A contractor calculates garment workers' wages in two main
ways: the piecework wage system and the homework wage system.
In the piecework wage system, the contractor pays the worker for
each garment she assembles or produces instead of for the amount
of time she works.30 Wages vary with this system because the
amount of pay depends on how fast the seamstress works; the
faster she sews, the more income she earns.31 The piecework wage
system remains the mainstay of the industry and is the way most
contractors pay garment workers.32
In the homework wage system, contractors send employees
home with piecework to be completed for the next day in order to
avoid paying legally mandated overtime wages.33 Garment work-
ers do not keep homework records because they fear it will cause
contractors to have problems with labor officials. Also, because
many of the workers are non-English speaking immigrants, they
are unable to keep "painstaking records. ,,
34
26. See id.
27. See Lam, supra note 14, at 639.
28. See id. at 640.
29. See Paul Feldman & Carl Ingram, 8 Suspects in Sweatshop Ring Plead Not Guilty,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1995, at B1.
30. See Lam, supra note 14, at 635. Wages run from one to nine dollars an hour at a
rate of a few cents per item completed. This is based on a typical skirt, which involves
sewing two darts, a waistband, and a zipper, and cutting a slit. See id. at 636 n.73 (citing
Serrin, supra note 20, at B4).
31. See id. at 636.
32. See id. at 635.
33. See id. at 636 (citing JACK CHEN, THE CHINESE OF AMERICA 238 (1980)).
34. See id. at 636 n.79 (citing Labor Department Hearing on Homework in the
Women's Apparel Industry, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D1, D3 (Apr. 4, 1989) (statement of
Jay Mazur, President, ILGWU)).
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III. COMPARING THE LABOR LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
THAILAND -THE IMPORTANCE OF ENFORCEMENT
A. Labor Law in Thailand
Overall, the inclusion of labor provisions in Asian constitu-
tions is a rather recent occurrence. 35 A starting point may be the
recognition of forced labor in the Thai Constitution. Although
Thailand has a free market economy, forced labor is still an ac-
ceptable means of government control "when the country is in a
state of armed conflict or war, or when a state of emergency or
martial law is declared. '36
Thailand's legal system is one of constant change. Since 1932,
when absolute monarchy fell in Thailand, there have been ten suc-
cessful coups, a number of failed coups, and fourteen constitu-
tions. 37 A possible reason for all these alterations in the constitu-
tion may be Thailand's evolving economy.
Due to large Japanese and Western investment, Thailand has
one of the largest economic growth-rates in the world, averaging
approximately 11% from 1987 through 1990, and slowing only to
7.5% in 1991.38 Thailand has been unable to alter its infrastructure
to keep pace with this growth. In turn, Japan has slowed its in-
vestment in Thailand because of the country's snarled phone lines,
traffic jams, and shortage of skilled workers.39 Even with this phe-
nomenal growth, Thai citizens continue to flock to the United
States. The reason lies in Thailand's Constitution and laws.
Thailand's Constitution lacks any provisions for special classes
of laborers, such as women or children. Among the directives of
the State under the Thai Constitution is the fair protection of labor
and wages. 40 Unfortunately, these labor provisions are considered
mere government pledges.41 According to a Western expert, the
35. See David Ziskind, Labor Provisions in Asian Constitutions, 6 COMP. LAB. L. 117,
118 (1984).
36. THAIL. CONST. (B.E. 2538,1995) ch. III, § 35.
37. See George J. Church, Growing Pains (Thailand), TIME, June 1, 1992, at 68.
38. See id.
39. See Stanley Reed et al., Will Thailand's 'Tiananmen' Derail the Go-Go Econ-
omy?, BUS. WK., June 1, 1992, at 51.
40. See THAIL. CONST. (B.E. 2538, 1995) ch. V, § 89.
41. See generally Ziskind, supra note 35.
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Thai legal system operates under the belief that the constitution is
"a goal, an ideal" to which laws are sometimes made to conform,
but sometimes not.42 While Thailand has no provisions that regu-
late the length of the work day, it does have a provision that pro-
vides for a minimum daily wage 43 and that promotes and maintains
public health."a
B. U.S. Labor Law and its Enforcement
In the United States, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 45
regulates minimum wage, 46 maximum hours,47 overtime pay,48 and
child labor. 49 The purpose of the FLSA was to correct, as rapidly
as practicable, conditions harmful to the maintenance of the mini-
mum standard of living necessary for the health, efficiency, and
general well-being of workers. 50 The expansion in manufacturing
during the early part of the twentieth century made the need for
regulation clear. Immigrants in search of a better life flocked to
the United States. 51 In sweatshops, men, women, and children of-
ten worked long hours for little pay.52 The FLSA, for the first time
in U.S. history, set a national wage standard and established a
standard workweek of forty hours, with additional hours paid at
time-and-a-half. 53
The FLSA originally defined an employee as "any employee
employed by an employer. ' 54 Under this original definition, cov-
erage was limited to individual employees who were engaged in
commerce, or in the production of goods for commerce, or in any
42. See Michael Vatikiotis, Latest Model: Will New Constitution Foster More Democ-
racy?, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 6, 1995, at 24, available in 1995 WL-FEER 2271529.
43. See THAIL. CONST. (B.E. 2538, 1995) ch. V, § 89.
44. See id.
45. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
46. See id. § 206.
47. See id. § 207.
48. See id.
49. See id. § 212.
50. See Lam, supra note 14, at 647 n.137 (citing S. REP. No. 1487, at 1-3 (1966)).
51. See SAR A. LEVITAN ET AL., PROTECTING AMERICAN WORKERS: AN AS-
SESSMENT OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS INC. 79 (1986).
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1994).
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fringe employment related to production. 55 As such, application
of this definition sometimes produced contrasting results; for ex-
ample, the FLSA would protect an employee on the assembly line,
but not a janitor in the same plant.56 The 1961 amendment to
FLSA changed the focus from the individual employee to the
business of the employer.
57
Determining if the employer is engaged in interstate com-
merce is another problem. The FLSA does not specify the per-
centage, volume, production of the goods, or amount of activity
that constitutes engagement in interstate commerce. 58 The courts
have stated that only minimal, recurring contact with interstate or
foreign commerce will render the FLSA applicable. 59 As a result
of this revision, the FLSA now covers eighty to ninety percent of
all privately employed persons60 and a significant portion of local
government employees.61
Under the FLSA, a workweek is defined as any regularly re-
curring period of seven consecutive twenty-four hour periods that
may begin at any hour of the day or week.62 Each workweek
stands alone and may not be averaged.63 Based on this workweek,
employees must be compensated at no less than one-and-a-half
times the regular rate of pay for all hours in excess of forty hours
per week. 64
The FLSA is not effective by itself. Similar to any other pro-
tective provision, it will not be effective unless properly enforced.
One of the main problems foreseen by legislators was that em-
55. See id.
56. See LEVITAN ET AL., supra note 51, at 79 (citing 9 THEORDORE W. KEEL, LABOR
LAW (1995)).
57. See 29 C.F.R. § 779 (1996).
58. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
59. See U.S. v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941); Mabee v. White Plains
Publ'g. Co., 327 U.S. 178, 181 (1946); Marshall v. Victoria Transp. Co., 603 F.2d 1122,
1124 (5th Cir. 1979).
60. See MATTHEW W. FINKIN ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL
EMPLOYEE 79 (1989).
61. The Supreme Court upheld the extension of minimum wage laws and overtime
requirements to state and local governments in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
62. See 29 C.F.R. § 778.105 (1996).
63. See id. § 778.104.
64. See 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1994).
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ployees would keep silent about employer abuses from fear that
they would be fired. According to the U.S. Supreme Court in
Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry,65 section 15(a)(3) of the FLSA was
designed to remove the risk of employer retaliation against em-
ployees who reported violations.66
The Secretary of Labor delegated the responsibility of admin-
istering the FLSA provisions to the Administrator of the Wage
and Hour Division of the Department of Labor.67 The Adminis-
trator investigates complaints and inspects records in order to de-
termine if a statutory violation has occurred. 68 In furtherance of
this end, the Administrator may issue subpoenas to obtain infor-
mation reasonably related to the investigations. 69
Upon receipt of a written request from an aggrieved em-
ployee, section.16(c) of the FLSA authorizes the Secretary to insti-
tute a civil action on behalf of the employee for unpaid minimum
wages and overtime pay.70 The FLSA also provides the employee
with an action to recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime
pay.71 The U.S. Department of Justice may also get involved and
institute criminal actions against "willful" violators of the FLSA.72
The Supreme Court states that "willful" is synonymous with
"voluntary," "deliberate," and "intentional. '73
C. Thai Labor Law: The Problem With Promises
Similar to U.S. labor law, enforcement is needed to ensure
65. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
66. See id. The Court stated that Congress did not intend to secure compliance with
FLSA by continuing detailed federal supervision. Instead, Congress chose to rely on
employee complaints, and compliance with FLSA could not be accomplished unless em-
ployees felt free to approach officials with their grievances. Thus, § 15(a)(3) proscribes
retaliatory acts against employees, and § 17 provides for its enforcement by the Secretary
of Labor. See id. at 296.
67. See 29 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1994).
68. See id. § 211(a).
69. See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 360 (1942); Walling v.
Detweiller Bros., 157 F.2d 841 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 819 (1946).
70. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1994).
71. See id. § 216(b).
72. See id. § 216(a).
73. See McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988). The Court stated
that a violation is "willful" when an employer either "knew or showed reckless disregard
for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the [FLSA]." See id.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
that the Thai government follows through with its pledges of fair
labor.74 Without enforcement, the promises will never fulfill their
potential for curing substandard conditions. Currently, the Thai
government has failed to bring its labor provisions in line with in-
ternational safety, health, and labor standards.75 Even with the
current laws in existence, their enforcement is a major part of the
problem.
For example, in May 1993, a toy factory fire in Thailand killed
200 people.76 The toy factory had neither emergency fire exits nor
emergency exit doors, despite the fact that in 1992, the Thai Gov-
ernment approved new labor laws, including fire security guide-
lines.77 These new laws were not effective because there were only
five fire inspectors for the 90,000 businesses in Thailand.78
Where Thailand's government has failed to improve labor
conditions, unions are trying to compensate. The liberty to form a
union is expressly stated among the "Rights and Liberties of the
Thai People" in the Thai Constitution.79 In fact, strikes and other
forms of protests date back to the early 1880s.80 Curiously though,
unions have been permitted to legally exist only for short intermit-
tent periods.81
Unfortunately, the union movement is weak and fragmented,
with only five percent of the work force organized. Amazingly,
however, the five percent constitutes over 700 unions.82 In 1991,
the Thai Government further hampered the movement towards
organized labor in Thailand by approving amendments to existing
labor laws that disbanded labor unions at state enterprises. 83 This
74. See generally Ziskind, supra note 35.
75. See generally id.
76. See Thailand: ICFTU Demands Investigation into Bangkok Fire, Inter Press
Service Global Information Network, May 14, 1993, available in 1993 WL 25409980.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See THAIL. CONST. (B.E. 2538, 1995) ch. III, § 43.
80. See Andrew Brown & Stephen Frenkel, Union Unevenness and Insecurity in
Thailand, in ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 82 (Stephen Frenkel ed.,
Cornell Int'l Indus. & Labor Relations Report No. 24, 1993).
81. See id. Unions have only legally existed for the following periods: 1932-1934,
1944-1947, 1955-1957, and 1972-1976.
82. See id.
83. See Thailand Effectively Disbands Unions Opposing Power Plant Privatization,
INDEP. POWER REP., Apr. 26, 1991, at 13, available in 1991 WL 2417530.
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disparity leads to the same conclusion: private-sector workers re-
main" unprotected and exploited.
IV. ATTEMPTING To STOP THE FLOW: WHY TEMPORARY CURES
HAVE NOT SLOWED THE WAVE OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS INTO
THE UNITED STATES
The garment worker will rarely, if ever, attempt to cure his or
her own situation. Garment workers thrown into the United
States are usually unaware of their labor rights. 84 When a worker
comes from a country that has few protective labor laws, such as
Thailand, why would he or she expect them in the United States?
More importantly, these immigrant workers feel lucky to have jobs
and are desperate to keep them at any cost.85 As such, the U.S.
government must be responsible for enforcing labor law policy.
Until 1986, federal law prohibited any person from assisting in
the willful or knowledgeable act of or attempt at concealing, har-
boring, shielding, or inducing entry of an illegal alien into or within
the United States.86  The loophole to this statute is that
"harboring" does not include employment, including the usual and
normal practices incident to employment. 87 This statute, while ef-
fective towards prosecuting the recruiters themselves, had no ef-
fect on the sweatshop owners.
Congress saw the need for reform and in 1986 it passed the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).8 8 IRCA
expressly proscribes the hiring of illegal aliens89 and imposes fines
against employers who hire undocumented workers. 90 The main
goal of IRCA was to reduce illegal immigration by driving illegal
aliens out of the workforce. 91
84. See Lam, supra note 14, at 640.
85. See id.
86. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1994).
87. See U.S. v. Lopez, 521 F.2d 437, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1975).
88. See Cecelia M. Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of Sanctions: The Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343 (1994) (citing Immigration Re-
form and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.) (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§
1101-1525 (1982))).
89. See id.
90. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (1994).
91. See BUREAU OF INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYER.
SANCTIONS AND U.S. LABOR MARKETS: FIRST REPORT 3 (1991).
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IRCA requires an employer to verify through documentation
the identity and eligibility of all employees for employment. 92 The
employee must first present proper documentation in one of the
forms listed under IRCA. 93 Once the employee presents the
document to the employer, the employer must examine the docu-
ment, note its identification number and expiration date, and attest
under penalty of perjury that the document appears genuine and
relates to the individual. 94 This information is documented on an
1-9 form, which must be made available for inspection by the De-
partment of Labor, Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Un-
fair Employment Practices, or INS officers after receiving notice of
an inspection.95
In Patel v. Sumani Corp.,96 the court found that Congress in-
tended the FLSA coverage to be consistent with IRCA policies. 97
The court determined that both employer sanctions and enforce-
ment of wage and hour standards served IRCA's objective of
eliminating employers' economic incentives to hire undocumented
aliens.98 The court further stated that the undocumented worker
in the case was "entitled to the full range of available remedies
under the FLSA without regard to his immigration status."99 In
theory, it would appear that the fines and relief available should
outweigh the gain from exploiting an undocumented alien. Thus,
any benefit of hiring illegal immigrants to work at substandard
wages disappears.
The enforcement of IRCA falls upon the Department of La-
92. See Espenoza, supra note 88, at 343 (citing INA § 274A(a)-(b)).
93. See The forms listed include, but are not limited to, the following: an expired or
unexpired passport, a certificate of U.S. citizenship, a certificate of naturalization, an un-
expired employment authorization document issued by the INS containing a photograph
of the bearer, a state driver's license or identification card containing a photograph, a
school identification card containing a photograph, and a social security card. Id. at 361
n.165 (citing INA § 274A(b)(1)(A)-(C); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(v)(A)-(C) (1996)). This
partial list demonstrates the wide variety of documents that satisfy the IRCA require-
ment.
94. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(i).
95. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(2)(ii).
96. 660 F. Supp. 1528 (N.D. Ala. 1987), rev'd sub nom. Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846
F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1988).
97. See 846 F.2d at 703.
98. See BUREAU OF INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, supra note 91.
99. 846 F.2d at 706.
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bor and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.1°° IRCA
authorizes the appropriation of funds to the Department of Labor
"to deter the employment of unauthorized aliens." 101 Even with
this level of cooperative help, however, the Department of Labor
and Immigration and Naturalization Service reach less than three
percent of the nation's estimated seven million employers.
10 2
Unfortunately, IRCA does not fulfill its promises. The effect
of IRCA was to drive garment workers further underground,
thereby increasing the number of workers employed in sweat-
shops.' 0 3 With this prevailing situation, a closer look suggests that
the government should not focus its attention on sweatshop own-
ers or contractors, but on clothing manufacturers themselves.
V. WHY NEGLIGENCE IS NOT A VIABLE SOLUTION
Negligence consists of five elements: duty, breach, cause in
fact, proximate cause, and damages. 10 4 Breach of duty is a ques-
tion of whether the defendant conducted himself as a reasonable
person would have conducted himself in the same or similar cir-
cumstances. 10 5 Cause in fact consists of a question of whether the
defendant's act was a substantial factor in bringing about the dam-
ages. 10 6 Proximate cause asks whether the damages were foresee-
able by the defendant. 107
100. See Espenoza, supra note 88, at 378 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
PUB. No. GAO-GGD-88-14, GAO IMMIGRATION REFORM: STATUS OF IMPLEMENTING
EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AFTER ONE YEAR 29 (1987)).
101. Richard E. Blum, Note, Labor Standards Enforcement and the Results of Labor
Migration: Protecting Undocumented Workers After Sure-Tan, the IRCA, and Patel, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1367 (citing Supplemental Authorization of Appropriations for Wage and
Hour Enforcement, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 111(d), 100 Stat. 3359, 3381 (1986)).
102. See Espenoza, supra note 88, at 378.
103. See Dennis Hayashi, Preventing Human Rights Abuses in the U.S. Garment Indus-
try: A Proposed Amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 195, 197
(1992) (citing EMPLOYMENT DEV. DEP'T, STATE OF CAL., GARMENT AND HOSPITALITY
INDUSTRY SURVEY ATTACHMENT 1 (1991)).
104. See FRANK J. VANDALL, STRICT LIABILITY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
45 (1992) (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 143, 144, 236-50 (4th
ed. 1971)).
105. See id. at 44.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 236; see also FRANK J. VANDALL, STRICT LIABILITY: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 45 (1992) (citing Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock &
Eng'g Co. (Wagon Mound No. 1), 1961 App. Cas. 388 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
185
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Although it appears from the five elements of negligence that
duty is a main issue in determining if the defendant was negligent,
courts often rest their decisions on the issue of proximate cause,108
which is the most troubling issue in negligence theory.10 9 Desig-
nating proximate cause as a factor of negligence enables courts to
control the reach of jury deliberations. 110 In answering the reach
of liability question, courts should look at the social policies of
prevention, loss shifting, and availability of insurance.111 Instead
of using a policy-balancing approach, courts generally resolve the
proximate cause issue by questioning whether the damages were
foreseeable by the defendant, the injury was remote, the occur-
rence was natural, or whether the defendant's act was the sole
proximate cause. 112 Thus, courts define negligence cases by pri-
marily relying on "foreseeability. ' 1 3 The obvious result is that
courts do not examine policy issues of prevention, loss shifting, and
availability of insurance. 114
Courts have decided negligence cases by "feelings" or
"hunches" rather than by weighing policy issues.115 In Wagon
Mound No. 1,116 the court found that the defendant shipowner was
not liable for allowing oil to flow into the harbor because it was
not "foreseeable" that oil floating in water would ignite. In In re
Arbitration Between Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co.,117 the court
found in favor of the plaintiff because the damaging fire was a
"direct" result of the plank's falling. 118 In neither of these cases
N.S.W.)).
108. See Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases (pts. 1 & 2), 28 COLUM.
L. REV. 1014 (1928), 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255 (1929).
109. See VANDALL, supra note 104, at 45.
*110. See id. at 45 (citing PROSSER, supra note 104, at 244-45).
111. See generally Green, supra note 108.
112. See VANDALL, supra note 104, at 45 (citing PROSSER, supra note 104, at 244-89).
For a case applying more than one of the proximate cause tests at the same time, see
Martin v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 192 S.E.2d 176 (Ga. Ct. App.), rev'd, 194 S.E.2d
910 (Ga. 1972).
113. See, e.g., In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 724 (2d Cir. 1964); In re Kins-
man Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
114. See VANDALL, supra note 104, at 45.
115. Seeld. at45.
116. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., 1961 App. Cas. 388
(P.C.) (appeal taken from N.S.W.).
117. [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (Eng. C.A.)).
118. [1921] 3 K.B. at 575, 577. In this case, a plank slipped and caused a spark, which
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did the court evaluate the costs and benefits involved. 119
Under a negligence standard, a manufacturer may successfully
argue sweatshop abuses are not foreseeable due to the contracts
signed by the sweatshop owners. These contracts give the appear-
ance that the sweatshops are performing an independent process
in the completion of the garment.
From an economic perspective, negligence results in the
product being underpriced and leads to overconsumption. 120 To
achieve an efficient market, a product must reflect all costs associ-
ated with its production. 121 One of the costs that should be inte-
grated into the product's price is damages. 122 Unlike negligence,
strict liability coerces efficient behavior because "it forces the in-
jurer.., to take into account all of the adverse effects of his behav-
ior on the victim. ' 123
The manufacturer reaps incredible financial benefits by forc-
ing the sweatshop worker to accept wages far below the FLSA
minimum standards. As such, the manufacturer should be forced
to bear the burden that accompanies these benefits by being held
strictly liable for the wage violations. The manufacturer may pass
on these costs directly to the consumer by increasing the price of
garments.
VI. STRICT LIABILITY: THE IMPORTANCE OF POLICY BALANCING
WHEN DETERMINING LIABILITY
The fundamental question of strict liability is who should bear
the loss. 124 In Cities Service Co. v. State,125 the court stated that
led to a fire that consumed the entire ship. See id. at 563.
119. See VANDALL, supra note 104, at 46.
120. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 98
(1983).
121. See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4
(1980).
122. See VANDALL, supra note 104, at 22.
123. POLINSKY, supra note 120, at 39. Frank Vandall includes the following example:
"[I]f a ten-speed bicycle costs $150.00, then a certain number of ten-speed bicycles will be
purchased. However, if that price were to reflect all of the injuries caused by ten-speed
bicycles, then the price would be higher, perhaps $175.00 or $200.00." VANDALL, supra
note 104, at 122. "The theory is that if the bicycle[s] were priced to reflect the actual
damages caused, the socially correct number of bicycles would be purchased and the mar-
ket would function efficiently." POLINSKY, supra note 120, at 98.
124. See VANDALL, supra note 104, at 46 (citing Spano v. Perini Corp., 250 N.E.2d 31
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"the justification for strict liability.., is that useful but dangerous
activities must pay their own way."'1 26 Although two authors have
stated that strict liability is a form of negligence, 127 courts have
held otherwise. 128
Strict liability against products manufacturers consists of the
idea that "one who sells any product in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer."' 129 Strict liability allows the court to weigh fac-
tors that negligence analysis does not consider, namely, the true
amount of control that the garment manufacturer enjoyed over the
sweatshop and its employees. Without the policy balancing of
strict liability, a negligence standard allows the garment manufac-
turer to escape liability.
The policies behind a strict liability standard include "loss
(N.Y. 1969)).
125. 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
126. Id. at 803.
127. Dean Page Keeton wrote:
There are two main points to emphasize. First, when plaintiff seeks to recover
for harm resulting from an alleged defective product on a theory of strict liabil-
ity, rather than negligence, he is not relieved from the burden of showing a de-
fect in the product which was likely present when the maker surrendered pos-
session and control. Second, when negligence is the basis for recovery, proof of
the same two requirements will normally serve as circumstantial evidence suffi-
cient for a finding on the part of the jury that the defect was the result of the
maker's negligence .... Therefore, while strict liability obviates the necessity
for convincing the jury as to the existence of negligence, it does not alter in any
substantial way the plaintiff's proof problems, and the satisfaction of plaintiff's
proof requirements for strict liability will generally result also in a finding of
negligence.
Page Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and
Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 563 (1969).
Professor John Wade indicated: "There is little difference here between the negli-
gence action and the action for strict liability." John W. Wade, On The Nature of Strict
Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 841 (1973). In another article, Professor
Wade wrote: "Thus, the test for imposing strict liability is whether the product was unrea-
sonably dangerous, to use the words of the Restatement .... It may be argued that this is
simply a test for negligence. Exactly." John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufac-
turers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15 (1965).
128. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 418 (1978) ("[T]his test reflects
our continued adherence to the principle that, in a product liability action, the trier of fact
must focus on the product, not the manufacturer's conduct, and that the plaintiff need not
prove that the manufacturer acted unreasonably or negligently in order to prevail.").
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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shifting, safety, superior knowledge, and insurance. ' 130  Loss
shifting is the theory that the product manufacturer is in a better
position to bear the damages by raising the price of the good to
cover the damages. 131 Safety is based on the idea that the manu-
facturer will exercise a higher degree of care to prevent injuries
and the resulting damage claims if held strictly liable.
132
A key rationale for holding a product manufacturer strictly li-
able is that the product manufacturer should be treated as an ex-
pert. 133 Consumers often know very little about the safety of their
purchases whereas the product manufacturer designs and builds
the product. 134 Thus, the product manufacturer is deemed to pos-
sess a superior ability to understand the inherent dangers associ-
ated with a particular product.135
As a practical example, the California Supreme Court
adopted strict liability in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products. 36
The court held that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when
an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being. ' 137 The court emphasized that this
"new" theory was not based on warranty law, but on the refusal
"to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own re-
sponsibility for defective products."'1 38
The Greenman decision was based on Justice Traynor's con-
curring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. 139 Justice
Traynor explained that:
It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of prod-
ucts having defects that are a menace to the public. If such
products nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the
public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury
130. VANDALL, supra note 104, at 20-22.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 21.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 22.
135. See Gary T. Walker, The Expanding Applicability of Strict Liability Principles:
How is a "Product" Defined?, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 3 (1986).
136. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962) (en banc).
137. Id. at 900.
138. Id. at 901.
139. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
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they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not
negligent in the manufacture of the product, is responsible for
its reaching the market.
140
Furthermore, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,141
the court stated that the risk of loss resulting from injury to con-
sumers is a "hazard of doing business. '' 142
In 1965, the American Law Institute created section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which specifically addressed
strict liability of manufacturers. 143 A majority of states have now
adopted section 402A or its equivalent as embodying the doctrine
of strict tort liability for defective products. 144
VII. IMPOSING STRICT LIABILITY ON THE MANUFACTURER:
GOING RIGHT TO THE SOURCE
The major policy argument against manufacturer liability is
that a buyer should not be held accountable for the seller's wrong-
doing.145 Manufacturers often insist that they are not responsible
for or aware of the publicized abuse of workers that occur in
sweatshops. 146 This argument is not realistic when the profits that
manufacturers make per garment and the amount of control that
the manufacturer exerts over the contractor are taken into ac-
count.
For example, a $120 skirt yields a $25 profit to the manufac-
turer and $10 to the contractor, of which, only $2.40 goes to the
140. Id. at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
141. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
142. Id. at 96.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonable dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and the user or consumer has not brought the product from or entered
into any contractural relationship with the seller.
144. See Mark E. Roszkowski & Robert A. Prentice, Reconciling Comparative Negli-
gence and Strict Liability: A Public Policy Analysis, 33 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 19 (1988).
145. See Lam, supra note 14, at 645.
146. See Bernstein, supra note 11.
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worker. 147 In calculating the retail price, the manufacturer takes
into account the labor costs, material costs, and desired profit
margin.148 Thus, the garment manufacturer not only has knowl-
edge of the manufacturing process in sweatshops, like a product
manufacturer, but is also in complete control of the entire produc-
tion process by the regulation of price.
The work performed by the garment worker is an integral part
of the manufacturer's normal business, and because the shop own-
ers do not furnish an independent business or other services rela-
tive to the manufacturer, an employment relationship can be rec-
ognized.149  The contractors provide all the labor except for
product design and marketing. 150 This integrated relationship be-
tween the manufacturer and the contractor supports the proposi-
tion that the two are in fact a common enterprise. 151
When evaluating the profits at each step,152 it is difficult to
understand why a contractor accepts such a low profit percentage.
The reason is because the manufacturer knows that there is an
overabundance of contract shops.153 This overabundance results
in underbidding competitions among contractors that compel them
to cut either the workers' wages or their own profits. 154 This com-
petition benefits the manufacturer, who pits contractors against
each other and achieves the lowest price possible. 155 With this
over-competitive system, the sweatshop can survive only by paying
contracted workers sub-minimal wage rates.156
Although clothing manufacturers deny responsibility for the
wage and hour violations that persist in the garment industry, they
147. See Lam, supra note 14, at 609 n.36 (citing Chin, supra note 15, at A10).
148. See id. at 629.
149. See id. at 659 (citing ARTHUR LAWSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION § 45.00, at 8-193).
150. See Botany Indus., Inc. v. New York Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers,
375 F. Supp. 485,494 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
151. See, e.g., Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 811-12 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
work of cake decorators is integral to the business of selling cakes); Brock v. Superior
Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that nursing work is an integral
part of defendant's health care service).
152. See Lam, supra note 14, at 629 (discussing the breakdown in the profit structure).
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have complete knowledge and control over the entire garment
manufacturing process, much like the product manufacturers in
the traditional strict liability scenario. Many manufacturers sign
contracts with the contractors, stating that all laws will be adhered
to and there will be no violations of any state or federal laws.
157
These contracts and their terms make manufacturers perceive that
liability lies elsewhere.158 In reality, manufacturers are the cause
of the problem.
The case of Danielson v. Joint Board of Coat, Suit & Allied
Garment Workers' Union I.L. G. W. U.159 explains the extent of the
manufacturer's involvement with the garment workers. The
manufacturer in this case, Hazantown, purchased the cloth to
make the clothing from a supplier, delivered it to the contractors
who manufactured the garments according to Hazantown's specifi-
cations, and upon redelivery sold the garments to retail establish-
ments. 160 Contracting out this production part of the business en-
ables manufacturers to minimize investment while providing
insulation from instability and risk. 161
In addition, manufacturers calculate contract prices that inac-
curately reflect the actual production costs. 162 This price is calcu-
lated by a time-and-motion study that should be based on the per-
formance of an average laborer working under average
conditions. 163 Taking this into account, a fair and realistic contract
price estimate must consider several factors, including: the quality
of sewing specifications, supervision, tools, equipment, the skill of
the garment workers, delays beyond the workers' control, the
amount contractors have to pay pieceworkers who cannot sew
enough pieces to earn the minimum wage, and the time workers
need to learn a new style. 164
A garment manufacturer's time-and-motion study is neither
157. See McDonnell & Feldman, supra note 16.
158. See Hayashi, supra note 103, at 203 (citing Robert Collier, Sewing for a Living:
Unregulated Exploitation, S.F. WKLY., July 24, 1991, at 1).
159. 494 F.2d 1230 (2d Cir. 1974).
160. See id. at 1231.
161. See Hayashi, supra note 103, at 199.
162. See id. at 203.
163. See id.
164. See id. (citing Merle Linda Wolin, Sweatshop: Underneath in the Garment Indus-
try, L.A. HERAID EXAMINER, Jan. 25, 1981, at A12).
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realistic nor fair. It is based on the time it takes sample-makers,
who are working under far better conditions than sweatshop work-
ers, to produce one item.1 65 Thus, contract prices based on the
manufacturer's study drastically underestimate the time necessary
for a garment worker to sew a piece of garment using an old ma-
chine and under little or no supervision. 16
6
Competition among various sweatshops force contractors to
accept undervalued contracts, which means that in order to turn a
profit, they cannot pay their workers minimum wage. 167 Once the
garments are completed, some manufacturers refuse to pay the
contract price because the apparel is purportedly either improp-
erly sewn or not delivered on time.168 The manufacturers' refusal
to pay for the goods forces the contractor to reduce the workers'
wages or go out of business, which means that the workers will not
be paid at all.169
These factors fit neatly into the joint employer doctrine set
forth in Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand of McAllen, Inc.17 0 In holding
that a crew leader and a grower were joint employers of a farm
worker, the court stated that "independent contractor status does
not necessarily imply the contractor is solely responsible for his
employees under the FLSA. Another employer may be jointly re-
sponsible for the contractor's employees. '' 171
The manufacturer, is not only the party most culpable for the
violations of garment workers' labor rights but also the best risk
allocator and the deepest pocket directly connected with the gar-.
ment worker. In the garment industry, the cost of labor is less than
ten percent of the consumer's cost for a garment.172 This benefit
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See Foo, supra note 10, at 2188.
168. See Hayashi, supra note 103, at 204.
169. See id.
170. 471 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603
F.2d 748, 756 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[I]ndependent contractor status ... does not... negate the
possibility that the contractee may ... be a joint employer of those workers under the
FLSA.") (citations omitted).
171. Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand of McAllen, Inc., 471 F.2d 235, 237 (5th Cir. 1973).
172. See Kelly Gust & Carolyn Newbergh, Threadbare Dreams, Abuses Abound in
Oakland Sweatshops, OAKLAND TRIB., July 28, 1991, at Al (explaining the costs associ-
ated with a dress that retails for $120: $10 or less than 10% for labor, $10 for the subcon-
tractor, $15 for the dress material, $25 for the manufacturer, and $60 for the retailer).
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of unfair, cheap labor should include the burden of it as well. The
manufacturer may pass the costs of compliance with the FLSA on
to the consumers, which means that the manufacturer is better
able to bear the financial burden.
173
Holding manufacturers liable Teduces the overabundance of
'subcontractors who drive contract prices down by severe under-
bidding. 174 This in turn encourages more stable and efficient shops
to open in their place. 175 The legitimate shops would be able to
modernize and have the bargaining power to demand higher con-
tract prices, which result in the ability to pay their workers mini-
mum wages. 176 Currently, the average life of a garment sweatshop
is thirteen months.177  Further, without this stabilization, any
chance of unionizing is a hopeless endeavor for a company whose
expected lifetime is slightly over one year.
An explanation for the continuation of subminimum wages in
the garment industry is that reduced labor costs are needed to
compete with low-wage Third World economies, 178 such as Thai-
land. If garment worker wages are increased to comply with the
FLSA, garment manufacturers may move their production to
overseas facilities. 179 This argument, however, is not realistic:
Current retail strategy makes local production of garments
necessary. Department stores and retailers no longer order large
inventories. Instead' they order many different styles of smaller
quantities, with greater variety and greater color selections. Un-
popular styles are dropped and "hot" styles in shorter runs are re-
ordered, necessitating quicker turnaround times that cannot be
met by offshore producers. A local contractor can produce a small
order in one week, whereas the turnaround time for garments as-
sembled in Asia is twelve weeks. 1
80
Currently, the FLSA relies heavily on government enforce-
173. See Lam, supra note 14, at 663.
174. See Foo, supra note 10, at 2210.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See Susan Headden, Made in the U.S.A., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 22,
1993, at 48.
178. See Saskia Sassen, The Informal Economy: Between New Developments and Old
Regulations, 103 YALE L.J. 2289 (1994).
179. See Foo, supra note 10, at 2211.
180. See id.
[Vol. 19:173
1996] Why Asian Immigrants Continue to Risk Their Lives 195
ment mechanisms that require resources that the government is
unwilling or unable to allocate.181 Self-policing by manufacturers
will not work because there is no legal incentive. 182 In 1990 and
1992, both houses of the California Legislature passed manufac-
turers' liability bills. 183 Both bills were vetoed by Governors
Dukemejian and Wilson.184 The failure of state action to remedy
the situation means that the federal government must step in and
implement sweeping and broad changes to the FLSA in order to
correct sweatshop abuses.
VIII. BUEERONG V. UVWAS: AN UPDATE
On September 5, 1995, the El Monte Thai immigrant workers
filed a civil complaint against the operators of the El Monte facil-
ity. 185 According to the complaint, the "operators" were the indi-
viduals or entities who allegedly operated the El Monte facility.' 8
6
While this was normal procedure, the surprise came with the
workers' first amended complaint. In it, the workers named the
"manufacturers" of the products as defendants.' 87
The allegations connecting the manufacturers with the op-
erators were based on the premise that each manufacturer
"exercised meaningful control over the work plaintiffs per-
formed."'1 88 The main allegation tying manufacturers as joint em-
ployers was:
[m]anufacturers engaged and continue to engage in a pattern
and practice of contracting at unfairly low prices by utilizing
garment contractors who are not registered and/or who are
chronic violators of labor laws, thus condemning plaintiffs and
181. See Hayashi, supra note 103, at 206 n.65 (citing H.R. 3125, 101st Cong. §§ 4-5
(1984)).
182. See Foo, supra note 10, at 2195.
183. See id. (citing A.B. 3930, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1989-1990); A.B. 1542, Reg. Sess. (Cal.
1991-1992)).
184. See id. (citing Governor George Deukmejian Veto Message to Assembly Bill
3930, 5 J. ASSEMBLY 9805 (Aug. 27, 1.990); Governor Pete Wilson's Veto Message to As-
sembly Bill 1542, 24 J. ASSEMBLY 10, 251 (Oct. 1, 1992)).
185. See Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1458 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
186. See id.
187. See id. at 1458-59. These manufacturers included Mervyn's; Tomato, Inc.; L.F.
Sportswear; Ms. Tops of California, Inc., Topson Downs of California, Inc.; F-40 Califor-
nia, Inc.; New Boys, Inc., Bigin, Inc.; Italian Club; and B.U.M. International, Inc. See id.
188. Id. at 1460.
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other garment workers to long hours of work without minimum
wages and overtime pay as required by law, to the detriment of
themselves, their families and to the public at large.
189
The manufacturer defendants countered this allegation by as-
serting that they were not employers of plaintiffs within the
meaning of the FLSA.190 The court responded that the FLSA did
not adequately define the term "employer" and that "[t]he Su-
preme Court ha[d] instructed . . . courts to interpret the term
'employ' in the FLSA expansively.' 191 The court further stated
that the Supreme Court's interpretation had forced the lower
courts to consider the economic reality of the relationship between
an alleged employer and employee. 192 This means the court must
"consider the totality of the circumstances of the relationship. ' 193
This "totality" is based on factors that the Ninth Circuit set
forth in Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency. 194 These
factors include "whether the alleged employer (1) had the power
to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled em-
ployee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) deter-
mined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained em-
ployment records. ' 195
In denying the manufacturer defendants' motion to dismiss,
the Bueerong court stated that plaintiffs had sufficiently pled that
the manufacturer defendants had "contracted with [the operators]
to produce garments at prices too low to permit payment of em-
ployees' minimum wages and overtime. Manufacturers utilize[d]
the business practice of contracting out garment manufacturing
work in part to avoid compliance with labor laws and liability for
violation of those laws., 196
Although Bueerong is only one case in the lower federal
court, it shows the realization that manufacturer and operator are
indeed one unit. Whether or not this position will hold during trial
189. Id. at 1460-61.
190. See id. at 1467.
191. Id.
192. See id.
193. Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Bonnette v. California
Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983)).
194. 704 F.2d at 1465.
195. Id. at 1470.
196. 922 F. Supp. at 1468.
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remains to be seen.
IX. CONCLUSION
While Bureerong shows that some courts are willing to unveil
the curtain manufacturers hide behind, it still requires each court
to determine if the individual manufacturer is an employer by
FLSA standards. Strict liability imposed on the manufacturer goes
right .to the source of the problem. Manufacturers realize that they
dominate the entire situation. Contractors realize that they will
only get the contract if they submit the lowest bid which equates to
a price that makes minimum wage impossible.
This complete control by the manufacturer should equate to
strict liability. Under strict liability, the manufacturer would be
held liable for any violations of workers' rights. It would be forced
to pay for the benefits it receives by having sweatshop workers toil
endlessly for subminimal wages.
Critics argue that imposing federal legislation against manu-
facturers will prompt them to move overseas and, therefore, the
United States must live with these deplorable violations to remain
competitive. 197 This argument is nonsensical and hypocritical in
the face of the FLSA and its policies to ensure fair wages for all. If
the critics were right, all low paying jobs would be overseas.
By imposing strict liability, workers would actually be able to
recover back wages. Currently, contractors found guilty of wage
and hourly violations simply file for bankruptcy and open a new
sweatshop in a different location.198 By holding the manufacturer
strictly liable, deep pockets are available to ensure payment of
hourly and wage violations. The manufacturer may then pass the
costs of compliance with the FLSA to consumers.199
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